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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CITY OF SALT LAKE,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No.

vs.

9990876

KEITH ROBERTS,
Defendant/Appellant.
oooOooo
ARGUMENT
POINT I
POINT I
DESPITE A CHANGE IN WORDING IN THE STATE STATUTE IN 1999, THE
CITY ORDINANCE REMAINS IN CONFLICT WITH STATE STATUTE.
Appellant

acknowledges

a change

in wording

in the

State

statute governing "lewdness", effective in May, 1999. Prior to May
of 1999, § 76-9-702 U.C.A. made it an act of lewdness to expose
"genitals or private parts. . . in a public place. . . " in May of
1999, the statute was expanded to prohibit exposure of "genitals,
the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, the
1

anus, or the pubic area. . . . " the statute, however, now prohibits
the exposure only "under circumstances which the person should know
would likely cause affront or alarm. . . . "

the previous statute

had been in place in the form cited by Defendant for several years.
Such a State prohibition was in effect when the City passed its
ordinance.

Nothing about the change supports the City's position

that the ordinance is not in conflict with State law.

In fact, it

might be argued that the State Legislature found the term "public
place" to be either unnecessary or too nebulous.
statute

does

a

sufficient

job

of

protecting

the

The current
public

by

prohibiting exposure in a manner "likely to cause front or alarm".
The City quotes the case of Patterson v. Utah County Board of
Adjustment,

893

P. 2d

602

(Utah App.

1995)

in

support

proposition that all ordinances are valid unless they

of

the

"do not

rationally promote the public health, safety, morals and welfare."
This Court, however, in that case addressed only the extent of
power delegated to cities.
statutes.

It did not discuss conflicts with State

Nothing in that decision altered the fact that the City

has no power to regulate the same conduct that is regulated by the
State, in an inconsistent manner.

As the Utah Supreme Court said

in State v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434, 20 Ut.2d 298 (Utah 1968) the city
has general police power except where the exercise of that police
power is "prohibited by statute or inconsistent therewith."
2

(1968.

UT. 36, 1[2 5 -- versuslaw.com).

The City, of course, contends that

the term "open to public view" prohibits a wider range of conduct
than does the similar term "in a public place". Defendant contends
that it is just the opposite.

Nevertheless, when neither of the

terms are defined, a citizen cannot be expected to differentiate
between the terms.

He is thus only required to take reasonable

precautions to avoid exposure in a manner that he will be seen by
others who might be offended.

Appellee has sought to portray the

evidence in this case as showing open conduct easily noticeable by
casual passersby.

As has previously been set forth in detail by

the appellant, the conduct took place against two blank walls
behind a parked truck.

The only way that "casual" passerby could

"sneak up" and get a look at what was going on, was by crawling
under the truck.

The City's attempt to finesse the ordinance

cannot support a verdict of "guilty" in this matter.

Both the

State statute and the City ordinance were designed to prohibit the
same conduct, that of public exposure of body parts which can be
expected to offend public sensibility.
covered.

Private conduct is not

If given enough time and enough authority, the police of

this State could search out a lot of conduct with which they did
not agree.

Utah, fortunately, is not as widely known for that

effort as is the State of Georgia.

Out of that tendency to snoop

into people's private lives have come some wonderful cases. In the
3

landmark case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) the United
States Supreme Court held that private possession of pornographic
material could not be criminalized.

And in the more recent case of

Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18, (Ga. 1998) the Supreme
Court

of

Georgia

found

a

"right

of

privacy"

in

the

State

Constitution sufficient to prohibit the State from criminalizing
private and consensual sodomy.

The Court stated:

Adults who "withdraw from the public gaze" to engage in
private unforced sexual behavior are exercising a right
"embraced within the right of personal liberty." We cannot
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank
as more private and more deserving of protection from
governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual
activity. (1998.GA.44286 ^19 -- versuslaw.com).
This case was not prosecuted because there was exposure in a
public place.

It was prosecuted because the police believed that

there was sexual conduct taking place, involving someone
recognized [as] a prostitute" (Appellee brief pg.4).

"they

In this case,

however, the City's ordinance which restricts conduct in "public"
was clearly used to prohibit private conduct of which the police
officers disapproved.
occurring,

there

is

If, in fact, there was a commercial sex act
indeed

a

law

that

prohibits

Unfortunately for the police, they have no proof of it.

that.

It is not

enough to go searching for an ordinance which might be stretched to
apply, when an officer cannot prove what he believes probably has
happened.

There are simply times when the police must recognize
4

that interference in personal lives must not be tolerated.
In People v. Legel, 24 111.App.3d 554, 321 N.E.2d 164 (111.
App. 1974) the Court was faced with a man who undressed and fondled
himself in the front window of his home "before unveiled glass
doors, with a light overhead in plain view of the casual observer
in the neighbor's living room."

The Court observed:

The defendant made no attempt to conceal his activities. To
the contrary, the evidence reveals that he did everything
possible in order to expose his lewd acts to others.
The
still photographs substantially collaborate the officer's
testimony.
The
evidence
is
clear,
convincing
and
uncontradicted.
It leaves no doubt that the defendant's
intent was to gain sexual gratification by causing shock and
consternation in those who observed his exhibition.
321
N.E.2d at 167.
Once again, the argument was over the term "public place".
Defendant claimed that his own home could not be a "public place"
for any purpose.

The Court first cited the committee comments of

the Illinois legislature, in passing the lewdness statute:
It is the probability of public view that is crucial rather
than the ownership or use of the particular real estate upon
which the act occurs. For example, a person standing nude
before a lighted window of his private apartment at night,
adjacent to a well traveled public sidewalk would be, for
purposes of the statute, in a public place. Contrariwise, a
couple in a parked car on a public right-of-way but in the
lonely lane might not be in a public place, depending upon the
likelihood of others traversing this particular area at such
hours. 321 N.E.2d at 168.
The Court went on to observe:
The vantage point of the observer is relevant only insofar as
it sheds light on the controlling inquiry on whether there was
5

a reasonable expectation that the actor's conduct would be
viewed by others. The purpose of this section is to protect
the public from shocking and embarrassing displays of sexual
activities.
The duty lies with the deviate to keep his activities private.
Where the evidence shows that it was reasonably foreseeable
that the lewd conduct would be viewed by the casual public
observer, there is a reasonable expectation of public view and
the acts can be held to have occurred in a "public place" by
reason of the statutory definition, id.
The conduct of this Defendant was not that of the Defendant in
Legel.

The officer admitted that he did not think the defendant

expected to be observed, nor did he wish to be.

Obviously

Defendant did not realize he was being trailed by someone who would
"sneak" under a truck in order to make the observation. No casual
observers did, in fact, observe the behavior.

Defendant thought

his conduct was private. The activities of this officer could not
reasonably have been expected; and Defendant met his duty to the
public at large.

POINT II
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF VAGUENESS FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.
The City contends that Defendant has raised the argument that
the City disorderly conduct is void for vagueness for the first
time on appeal.

In fact, Defendant does not contend that the

ordinance is facially invalid for vagueness.

He only contends

that, if the ordinance can be stretched as far as Plaintiff
contends it can be, it becomes unconstitutionally vague as applied.
6

In fact, Defendant did make the same arguments at trial.
be noted

that

counsel

filed

his

appearance

It should

in behalf

of

the

Defendant in the District Court on August 25, 1999. Trial was held
on August 30.
quickly.

Needless to say, the trial memorandum was written

Nevertheless, Defendant did argue the meaning of the

terms "open to public view" and "in a public place"; and Defendant
did

suggest

that

the

term

open

to public

construed as broadly as the City claimed.
essence of Defendant's argument.

view
That

could

not

be

is still the

Defendant has not opened a new

front by suggesting that the way the City interprets the ordinance
it so vague that it cannot be reasonably interpreted by those
seeking to comply with it.
It is the City that has sought to broaden the issues on
appeal.
legal

At no time in the trial court, did the City set forth its

theory

supporting

the

contention

that

conduct between the Defendant and his companion.
clearly

defined

Defendant's

by

State

law,

brief.

The

City

inconsistent ordinance at trial.

in

there

cited

sexual

Sexual conduct is

§76-10-1301

never

was

(4), cited
their

in

obviously

The trial court could not have

relied on it in finding Defendant guilty.

It was obvious that the

police officer was looking for something that was prohibited by the
State and City laws against commercial
includes

only

the

acts prohibited

by

sex.

Such prohibition

§76-10-1301.

Defendant

concedes that the officer alleged that he saw the exposed breast
from further away than he was when he allegedly
7

observed the

exposed penis.

That does not matter.

a casual passerby.

The officer was in no sense

Defendant's statement of facts detail the

efforts of the officers in which they "snuck around" to approach
the car unseen.

Even conceding what the City now argues, that it

was not the exposed penis at all, does not change the legal or
factual situation.
POINT III
APPELLEE CITES AN INCORRECT STANDARD IN ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED. A REMAND FOR RETRIAL MAY
BE NECESSARY, BECAUSE OF THE FACTUAL QUESTIONS.
The City, in its brief, cites correct standards of review in
its initial

reference on page one. In Point

IV of the brief,

however, the City argues (in slightly less than one page) that the
trial court should not be overruled unless its "factual findings"
are deemed "clearly erroneous".

At best, the question is a mixed

one of fact and law "which, on review, do[es] not require the
deference

due

to

findings

on

questions

of

Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d

pure
1195

fact."

See

(Utah 1985) .

Defendant contends, however, that this is primarily an issue of law
upon which the trial court is not granted deference at all.
issue is the meaning of an ordinance.

At

In making the one page

argument in Point IV, the City has certainly mischaracterized the
evidence.

The City states "officer Russell while standing in the

parking lot could see the defendant parked in the car kissing the
exposed breasts of the women he was with."

It is further stated

that the conduct "occurred in a parking lot where customers of the
8

lounge were walking back and forth to their cars".
conduct did not so occur.

In fact, the

The parking lot in which customers may

have been walking back and forth to their cars, was blocked from
viewing the Defendant by the presence of the large truck.

It is

indeed difficult to preserve the feel of the evidence as reviewed
by the District Court, due to the fact that it appeared impossible
to preserve the drawings (TR 10). Nevertheless, the testimony as
set

forth on pages 4 through

6 of Appellant's previous brief

clearly shows that Defendant was well away from where customers
might be. Appellant comes to this Court somewhat frustrated by the
lack of drawings and other material which might better inform this
Court of the exact facts of this case.
have some advantage over this Court

Yes, the Trial Court did
in reviewing those facts.

Nevertheless, the Trial Court misconstrued the law, and based its
decision on a misapplication of that law.
"standard

of

review"

section

of

Plaintiff states in the

its brief

that

"a remand

is

unnecessary where undisputed facts allow Appellate Courts to fairly
and properly resolve the case on the record."

In doing so, the

City cites Flying Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618
(Utah 1989).

Conversely:

It is generally the law that the failure of a trial court to
make findings on all material issues necessary to support its
judgment is an error that usually requires a remand for the
purpose of allowing the trial court to make such findings. 776
P.2d at 622.
9

Defendant acknowledges that it may be difficult for this Court
to envision the circumstances without the drawings made by the
police officer.
to interpret

It is the right and duty of this Court, however,

the law.

Defendant

believes that

the record is

sufficient to show that he is not guilty of the crime charged.

If,

however, the Court cannot determine that as a matter of law, this
Court should then set forth the legal standard that the Trial Court
should use and remand this matter to the Trial Court to review the
facts once more in light of the proper legal standards.

It is not

sufficient to say that the facts may have been adequate to prove
Defendant guilty, when it is clear that the Trial Court used the
wrong legal standards.
be

reversed

and

Defendant asks, of course, that this case

dismissed

immediately.

In

the

alternative,

however, this Court should consider remanding the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion on the law.
CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to a judgment dismissing the charge
brought against him.

In the alternative, this Court should remand

this matter for a retrial after correcting the trial court's errors
of law in interpreting the ordinance at issue.
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DATED this

day of February, 2000.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/ n

day of February, 2 000, I

hand delivered two true and correct copies of Appellant's Reply
Brief to Richard Daynes, Attorney for Appellee, 349 South 200 East,
Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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